

# Śāntarakṣita on Two Kinds of Arguments for Self-Awareness: *sahopalambhaniyama* and *saṃvedana*

by

Hiroko Matsuoka

## Introduction

In the last part of the *Pratyakṣa* chapter of his *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (PVin I 39,13–43,7), Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660)<sup>1</sup> presents two kinds of arguments to prove self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*). Since the theory of self-awareness that a cognition is aware of itself presupposes that an object and the cognition thereof are non-different; and hence the cognition of an object is nothing but the cognition of the cognition itself, the former is established on the basis of the fact that both are necessarily perceived together (*sahopalambhaniyama*);<sup>2</sup> the latter is established on account of its essential nature of being a cognition (*saṃvedana*).<sup>3</sup> Following Iwata (1991), I am going to call these two arguments the *sahopalambhaniyama* and *saṃvedana* arguments, respectively.

What led Dharmakīrti to develop these arguments? Concerning the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument, Iwata (1991: 20–24) examines how the argument could have been derived directly from the view that is presented by Dignāga (c. 480–540) in *Ālambanaparīkṣā* v. 6 and the *Vṛtti* thereon, namely, that an object-support (*ālambana*) for a cognition is a form within the cognition itself (*antarjñeyarūpa*). Taber (2010) argues that crucial elements of the argument are found in the *Śūnyavāda* chapter of Kumāriḷa's (c. 600–650) *Ślokavārttika* vv. 31–34. Concerning the *saṃvedana* argument, on the other hand, no attempts have yet been made to determine the details of its provenance.

The aim of this paper is to explore both of these issues equally, at the same time, namely with the help of the *Bahirarthaparīkṣā* chapter of the *Tattvasaṅgraha*. In this,

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<sup>1</sup> For the date of Dharmakīrti I shall provisionally follow Frauwallner (1961: 137–139). This dating has been discussed by several scholars, most notably by Krasser (2012). He pointed out the common wordings like *sattvānumāna* in Bhāviveka's (490/500–570) and Dharmakīrti's works and an almost identical verse in Bhāviveka's and Kumāriḷa's works. In his conclusion Krasser hypothesized that the time of activity of both Dharmakīrti and Kumāriḷa is the middle of the sixth century. Krasser's hypothesis is not fully accepted by scholars, e.g. by Watanabe (2014) and by Franco (2015–2018). This paper does not discuss the date of Dharmakīrti and Kumāriḷa but attests to the chronological ordering of Kumāriḷa and Dharmakīrti, namely, in that order. For the relationship between Kumāriḷa and Dharmakīrti, see also Yoshimizu 2007 and Kataoka 2010.

<sup>2</sup> PVin I 54ab: *sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ* // See also PV III 332–336; 387–397.

<sup>3</sup> PVin I 42,3: *saṃvedanam ity api tasya tādātmyāt tathāprathanam, na tad anyasya kasyacid ātmasaṃvedanavat / tato 'pi na tad arthāntare yuktam* // See also PV III 326–329.

Śāntarakṣita (c. 725–788), while discussing the *sahopalambhaniyama* and *saṃvedana* arguments, directly references Kumāriḷa’s arguments aimed at proving that a cognition has an external entity for its object. In particular, I hope to provide evidence in favor of Śāntarakṣita’s view that Dharmakīrti was responding directly to Kumāriḷa. In order to do this, I will first present Kumāriḷa’s arguments in section 1, and then, in section 2, I will discuss the corresponding details of Śāntarakṣita’s refutation, which follows but also builds upon the arguments of his predecessor, Dharmakīrti. With this foundation in place, section 3 will provide one final piece of evidence in favor of Śāntarakṣita’s view, namely, that he sees in the dual nature of Dharmakīrti’s argumentation an attempt to refute the *nirākāravādin*’s view rather than to simply improve Dignāga’s theory of self-awareness.

## 1. Kumāriḷa’s refutation of self-awareness

Kumāriḷa is only one among many concerns for Śāntarakṣita. The *Bahirarthaparīkṣā* chapter of the latter’s TS is meant to establish the *viḷṅānavāda* theory of *viḷṅāptimātratā* or “mind-only.” According to Kamalaśīla (c. 740–795), author of the *pañjikā* commentary, this chapter is divided into two parts: in the first part, Śāntarakṣita establishes that an external object cannot exist independently of cognition (*arthāyoga*) (TS<sub>2</sub> 1964–1997); in the second part, he proves that cognition is devoid of the characteristics of being either grasped or grasper (*grāhyagrāhakaḷakṣaṇavaidhurya*), that is, that cognition consists in self-awareness (*āmasaṃvedana*) (TS<sub>2</sub> 1998–2083). In this second part, Śāntarakṣita proceeds in three steps: first, he posits his own arguments denying the existence of external objects (*bāhyārthaniṣedhaka*) (TS<sub>2</sub> 1998–2049); secondly, he refutes arguments formulated by various realists such as Śubhagupta, Uddyotakara and Kumāriḷa, to establish the existence of such objects (*bāhyārthasādhaka*) (TS<sub>2</sub> 2050–2077); and lastly, he presents the fundamental (*maula*) argument for establishing *viḷṅāptimātratā* (TS<sub>2</sub> 2078–2083).

While refuting the realist arguments, Śāntarakṣita cites verses from the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*<sup>4</sup> of Kumāriḷa, corresponding to ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 172cd–177ab, which contain seven arguments for proving the existence of external objects (*bāhyārthasādhaka*) (TS<sub>2</sub> 2063–2067). In ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 172cd–177ab, after first presenting them earlier in the same chapter (verses 5–17), Kumāriḷa then refutes *viḷṅānavāda*, more precisely, Dignāga’s arguments for self-awareness,<sup>5</sup> by moving through the series of arguments in the same order as before.<sup>6</sup> It is these seven arguments that we will examine in the current section 1. They can be classified into two groups according to the theses (*pakṣa*) that they support:

1. An object and its cognition are different (*bhinna*) from each other.
2. A cognition neither cognizes a part of itself (*svāṃśa*) nor is cognized by a part of itself.

<sup>4</sup> For discussions of quotations from the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* in the TS(P), see Frauwallner 1962, Taber 1986–1992, Krasser 1999: 216 and Kataoka 2011: 25–27. See also the invaluable contribution of Yoshimizu (2007) showing that the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* is earlier than the PV, thus refuting Frauwallner’s influential hypothesis.

<sup>5</sup> See section 1.1.2.

<sup>6</sup> See Bhatt 1962 and Teraishi 2002: 153–154 for a detailed structural analysis of the *Śūnyavāda* chapter.

These two groups closely relate to Dharmakīrti's *sahopalambhaniyama* and *saṃvedana* arguments, respectively, as I will demonstrate below. The first group is discussed in section 1.1, and the second in section 1.2.

### 1.1 Arguing for the difference between an object and its cognition

The four arguments in this first group can be labeled as follows:

1. The *tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti* argument;
2. The *tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa* argument;
3. The *itaretaraparāmarśa-itaretarāparāmarśa* argument;
4. The *aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna* argument.

These arguments will now be discussed individually in the following sections.

#### 1.1.1 The *tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti* argument

The *tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti* argument reads as follows:<sup>7</sup>

The grasper (*grāhaka*) of color is different from the grasped [color] (*grāhya*) because the former is not perceived when the latter is perceived (*tatsaṃvittāv asaṃvittēḥ*), like the grasper of flavor, etc.

In ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 79,<sup>8</sup> Kumārila explains that the *tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti* argument is based on the *Bhāṣya* of Śabara (6<sup>th</sup> c.), where it is stated that it is only an object connected with the external world (*bahirdeśasambaddha*) that is perceived by sense-perception (*pratyakṣa*).<sup>9</sup>

#### 1.1.2 The *tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa* argument

The *tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa* argument is as follows:<sup>10</sup>

The grasped [color] is different from [the cognition] that grasps it because the former is not necessarily recollected by one who recollects the latter, like the grasper of flavor, etc.

<sup>7</sup> ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 172cd–173ab: *tasmād yad grāhakaṃ rūpe tadgrāhyāt tasya bhinnatā // tatsaṃvittāv asaṃvittē rasādigrāhakaṃ yathā // TS<sub>2</sub> 2063: atha yad grāhakaṃ rūpe tadgrāhyāt tasya bhinnatā // tatsaṃvittāv asaṃvittē rasādigrāhakaṃ yathā // (tasmād ŚV : atha TS; grāhakaṃ ŚV<sub>M</sub>, ŚV<sub>T</sub>, TS : bhāsakaṃ ŚV<sub>V</sub>; rūpe TS : rūpaṃ ŚV.)* Here as well as in the following, “ŚV” is in the reporting of variants used as a shorthand for all three editions ŚV<sub>V</sub>, ŚV<sub>T</sub> and ŚV<sub>M</sub>.

<sup>8</sup> ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 79: *sa bahirdeśasambaddha ity (ŚBh 28,17 on 1.1.4. See n. 9.) anena nirūpyate / grāhyākārasya saṃvittir grāhakānubhavād ṛte // TS<sub>2</sub> 2069: sa bahirdeśasambaddha ity anena nanūcyate / grāhyākārasya saṃvittir grāhakānubhavād ṛte // (nirūpyate ŚV : nanūcyate TS.)*

<sup>9</sup> ŚBh 28,17 on 1.1.4: *syād etat – evaṃ yady arthākārā buddhiḥ syāt / nirākārā tu no buddhiḥ, ākāravān bāhyo 'rthaḥ / sa hi bahirdeśasambaddhaḥ pratyakṣam upalabhyate /*

<sup>10</sup> ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 173cd–174ab: *grāhyaṃ tadgrāhakād bhinnaṃ tatparāmrśatā yataḥ // na parāmrśyate 'vaśyaṃ rasādigrāhakaṃ yathā // TS<sub>2</sub> 2064: grāhyaṃ tadgrāhakād bhinnaṃ tatparāmrśatā yataḥ / na parāmrśyate 'vaśyaṃ rasādigrāhakādivat // (-kād bhinnaṃ ŚV<sub>M</sub> : -kāc caivaṃ ŚV<sub>T</sub> TS : -kāc caiva ŚV<sub>V</sub>; yathā ŚV : -kādivat TS)* As for TS<sub>2</sub> 2064, the reading *-kāc caivaṃ* attested in TS<sub>J</sub> and TS<sub>Pa</sub> (and also chosen for the editions TS<sub>1</sub> and TS<sub>2</sub>) is here emended to *bhinnaṃ* following ŚV<sub>M</sub>.

According to ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 82–85,<sup>11</sup> the *tatparāmarśa-āparāmarśa* argument is also based on Śabara's *Bhāṣya*. Śabara argues that there are cases where one remembers a cognition that occurred in the past, without at the same time remembering what one cognized.<sup>12</sup>

The *tatparāmarśa-āparāmarśa* argument is undoubtedly directed against a point made by Dignāga in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* I v. 11cd and the *Vṛtti* thereon. There, Dignāga argues that a cognition has both characteristics (*dvirūpatā*), namely, both the characteristic of being the grasped and that of being the grasper, and that such a cognition is cognized by itself (*svasaṃvedyatā*). He claims that these two points are to be accepted on the basis of the empirical fact that both grasper and grasped are remembered afterwards (*smṛter uttarakālam* PS I 11c).<sup>13</sup>

### 1.1.3 The *itaretaraparāmarśa-itaretarāparāmarśa* argument

The *itaretaraparāmarśa-itaretarāparāmarśa* argument is as follows:<sup>14</sup>

The two (i.e., the grasped and the grasper) are mutually different (*bhinna*) [because one is not recollected when the other is recollected (*itaretaraparāmarśa itaretarāparāmarśāt*)],<sup>15</sup> like flavor [and color],<sup>16</sup> etc.

Pārthasārathi (10<sup>th</sup> c.) comments that each of the two is remembered by excluding the other (*parasparaparīhāreṇa*).<sup>17</sup> The point is that the recollection of an object cannot simultaneously be the recollection of its cognition and vice versa. Whatever is an object is not a cognition, and whatever is a cognition is not an object. These two properties exclude each other.

<sup>11</sup> ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 82–85: *na pūrvaṃ jñāyate buddhir ity* (ŚBh 30,5 on 1.1.4. See n. 12.) *atraitad vadiṣyate / grāhakasyaiva saṃvittir lakṣyate grahaṇe kvacit // na smarāmi mayā ko 'pi grhīto 'rthas tadeti hi / smaranti grāhakotpādaṃ grāhyarūpavivarjitam // tasmād abhinnaṭyāyāṃ ca grāhye 'pi smarāṇaṃ bhavet / grāhakasmṛtinirbhāsāt tatrāpy eṣaiva grhyate // tad atyantāvinābhāvān* (ŚV<sub>T</sub>; *tadatyantā-ŚV<sub>M</sub> ŚV<sub>V</sub>*) *naikākāraṃ hi jāyate // anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ siddhaivaṃ bhinnatā tayoh // TS<sub>2</sub> 2070–2072* correspond to 83–84 and 85cd: *na smarāmi mayā ko 'pi grhīto 'rthas tadeti ca / smaranti grāhakotpādaṃ grāhyarūpavivarjitam // tasmād abhinnaṭyāyāṃ ca grāhye 'pi smarāṇaṃ bhavet / grāhakasmṛtisadbhāve tatra tv evaiṣa grhyate // anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ siddhaivaṃ bhinnatā tayoh / evaṃ ca hetavo 'py ete prasiddhāḥ sādhyadharmiṇi // (83b hi ŚV : ca TS; -pādaṃ grāhya- ŚV<sub>M</sub> ŚV<sub>T</sub> TS : -pādaṃ grāhya- ŚV<sub>V</sub>; -smṛtinirbhāsāt- ŚV<sub>T</sub> ŚV<sub>V</sub>; -smṛtir nirbhāsā ŚV<sub>M</sub>; -smṛtisadbhāve TS; tatrāpy eṣaiva ŚV : tatra tv evaiṣa TS; grhyate ŚV<sub>T</sub> ŚV<sub>V</sub> TS; dṛśyate ŚV<sub>M</sub>.)*

<sup>12</sup> ŚBh 30,5 on 1.1.4: *na tu pūrvaṃ jñāyate / bhavati hi kadācid etad yaj jñāto 'rthaḥ san "ajñāta" ity ucyate /*

<sup>13</sup> PSV I 5,1 on PS I 11cd (verse parts from PS are printed in bold): ***smṛter uttarakālam ca*** (PS I 11c) *dvairūpyam iti sambandhaḥ / yasmāc cānubhavottarakālam viṣaya iva jñāne 'pi smṛtir utpadyate tasmād asti dvirūpatā jñānasya svasaṃvedyatā ca // kiṃ kāraṇaṃ na hy asāv avibhāvite // (PS I 11d) na hy ananubhūtarthavedanasṛtī rūpādisṛtivat /* See the most recent studies of PS(V) I 11 by Kellner (2010) and by Kataoka (2012).

<sup>14</sup> ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 174cd (quoted in TS<sub>2</sub> 2065ab): *dvayaṃ paraspareṇaiva bhinnāṃ sādhyāṃ rasādivat //*  
<sup>15</sup> Kā 163,12 on ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 174cd: *itaretaraparāmarśa itaretarāparāmarśāt... / NR 226,4 on ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 174cd: parasparaparīhāreṇa parāmarśāt ... / TSP<sub>2</sub> 704,22 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2065: ekataraparāmarśe saty aparasyāparāmarśanāt / (aparasyāparāmarśanāt em. following TSP<sub>1</sub>: aparāmarśanāt TSP<sub>1</sub>, TSP<sub>Pa</sub>. The edition TSP<sub>2</sub> emends to aparaparāmarśanāt, the Tibetan translation T has *gzhan mi rtoḡ pa'i phyir* ro.) Cf. TṬ 281,18 on ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 174cd: *hetudṛṣṭāntau tāv eva /**

<sup>16</sup> NR 226,4 on ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 174cd: *rūparasavad iti /*

<sup>17</sup> For the concept of *virodha*, see Bandyopadhyay 1988, Kyuma 1999 and Watanabe 2002.

### 1.1.4 The *aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna* (*bhedopalambhana*) argument

The *aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna* argument is as follows:<sup>18</sup>

[The two (i.e., the grasped and the grasper) are mutually different] because they are not perceived as identical (*aikarūpyeṇājñānāt*),<sup>19</sup> like another [mental] continuum (*santānāntara*) and the cognition thereof.

Importantly, this *aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna* argument is reformulated by Umbeka (8<sup>th</sup> c.) as follows:<sup>20</sup>

Blue and the cognition thereof are different (*bheda*) from each other because they are perceived separately (*bhedopalambhanāt*).

Here Umbeka is drawing a contrast between the *aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna* argument and Dharmakīrti's *sahopalambhaniyama* argument, the latter of which is formulated as follows:

PVin I 54ab:

*sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ /*

Blue and the cognition thereof are not different (*abheda*) [from each other] because they are necessarily perceived together (*sahopalambhaniyamāt*).

According to Umbeka,<sup>21</sup> Kumāriḷa's *aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna* argument is thus a counter-argument to Dharmakīrti's *sahopalambhaniyama* argument. This represents the opposite of Śāntarakṣita's interpretation, namely that the latter argument of Dharmakīrti is actually responding to the former by Kumāriḷa. We will return to this point later.

## 1.2 Arguing against self-awareness

Kumāriḷa goes on to formulate the following arguments of the second group to establish that a relation between the grasped and the grasper never exists within a cognition.<sup>22</sup>

1. The *jñāna-utpatti* argument against a cognition grasping a part of itself;
2. The *jñāna-utpatti* argument against a cognition being grasped by a part of itself;
3. The *jñānatva* argument.

<sup>18</sup> ŚV Śūnyavāda 175ab: *aikarūpyeṇa vājñānāt santānāntarabuddhivat / TS<sub>2</sub> 2065cd: aikarūpyeṇa vājñānāt santānāntarabuddhivat // (vājñā- TS : cājñā- ŚV<sub>M</sub> : vijñā- ŚV<sub>T</sub>, ŚV<sub>V</sub>; aikarūpyeṇa TS<sub>J</sub>, ŚV : ekyarūpeṇa TS<sub>Pa</sub>, also adopted in the editions TS<sub>1</sub> and TS<sub>2</sub>.)*

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Kā 163,15 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175ab: *grāhyaṃ grāhakād bhinnam tena sahaikarūpyeṇājñānāt /* "The grasped is not different from the grasper because the former is not perceived as identical with the latter."

<sup>20</sup> TṬ 282,9 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175ab: *nīlabuddhyor iti dharmitvam, paraspareṇa bheda iti sādhyo dharmah / nīlam idam iti bhedopalambhanād iti hetuḥ /*

<sup>21</sup> TṬ 282,11 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175ab: *abhedasādhakasya sahopalambhasya, paroktasya vā sahopalambhaniyamād ity asyāsiddhatām anenāha /*

<sup>22</sup> TṬ 282,12 on ŚV Śūnyavāda 175cd–177ab: *idānīm ekavijñānasambandhinor dharmayor grāhyagrāhakabhāvo nāstīti yad uktam, tatra prayogam āha – jñānam svāṃśam na grḥṇātīti /*

### 1.2.1 The two *jñāna-utpatti* arguments

These two arguments have a same logical reason and are thus treated as a pair.

The *jñāna-utpatti* argument against a cognition grasping a part of itself is as follows:<sup>23</sup>

A cognition does not grasp a part of itself (*svāmśa*) because it is produced from a cognition (*jñānotpatteḥ*), like a power of [cognition] itself (*svaśakti*).

The *jñāna-utpatti* argument against a cognition being grasped by a part of itself is as follows:<sup>24</sup>

A cognition is not grasped by a part of itself because it is produced from a cognition, like a power of [cognition] itself.<sup>25</sup>

Within the framework of the *viññānavāda*,<sup>26</sup> one may say the following: What is meant by the word *svaśakti* is a latent impression (*vāsanā*).<sup>27</sup> The latent impression is produced from a cognition (*jñānotpatti*) and devoid of both the property of being grasped and that of being grasper.<sup>28</sup> Now, a cognition arises from its immediately preceding condition, which

<sup>23</sup> ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 175cd (quoted in TS<sub>2</sub> 2066ab): *jñānaṃ svāmśaṃ na grhṇāti jñānotpatteḥ svaśaktivat* //

<sup>24</sup> ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 176ab (quoted in TS<sub>2</sub> 2066cd): *grāhyatvapratīṣedhaś ca dvayahīnā hi vāsanā / (grāhyatvapratī- TS; grāhyavat prati- ŚV<sub>M</sub>; grāhyatvaṃ prati- ŚV<sub>V</sub>; hi vā- ŚV<sub>M</sub> TS; dvivā- ŚV<sub>T</sub> ŚV<sub>V</sub>)* “[For the same reason,] there is also the negation of [a cognition] being grasped [by a part of itself]. For, a latent impression (*vāsanā*) is devoid of both [the property of being the grasped and that of the grasper].” TṬ 282,13 on ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 176a: *jñānaṃ svāmśaṃ na grhṇāti na vā svāmśena grhyate ... / NR 226,10 on ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 176a: *jñānaṃ svāmśaṃ na grhṇāti nāpi svāmśena grhyate /**

<sup>25</sup> See TSP<sub>2</sub> 705,11 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2066c: *tadyathā – jñānāṃśo na jñānagrāhyaḥ / jñānād utpannatvāt / tadvat vāsanāvāt /* “A part of cognition is not grasped by the same cognition because it is produced from a cognition, like that [power of itself], namely, like a latent impression.”

<sup>26</sup> According to Sucarita (10<sup>th</sup> c.), Kumāriḥ formulates the *jñāna-utpatti* arguments from the standpoint of the “old” Buddhist who regards a latent impression (*vāsanā*) as distinct from a cognition (*jñānātiriktavāsanā*). On the other hand, the “modern” Buddhist holds that a latent impression is not distinguished from the immediately preceding cognition (*samanantarajñāna*) itself. Kā 163,27 on ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 175cd–176ab: *etac ca cirantanabauddhābhiprāyeṇa jñānātiriktavāsanāpakṣe sthītvoktam iti draṣṭavyam / na tūpādānāparanāmo viśiṣṭāt samanantarajñānād anyāṃ kāñcid vāsanām arvācīnā manyante //* For Prajñākaragupta (c. 750–810), a latent impression is not the power produced from the preceding cognition (*pūrvaviññājanitā śaktiḥ*), but the immediately preceding cognition itself (*samanantaraviññātmabhūtā*). PVA 356,6: *vāsaneti hi pūrvaviññājanitāṃ śaktim āmananti vāsanāsvarūpavidaḥ /*; PVA 356,23: *[na ca] samanantaraviññātmabhūtā vāsanesyate //* As Kobayashi (2001: 327) has pointed out, Yamāri (c. 1000–1060) refers to a discrepancy in the views of Dharmottara (c. 740–800) and Prajñākaragupta on whether a latent impression is distinct from the immediately preceding cognition or not. PVAṬS II (D 259a4; P 347b7): *de ltar na re zhig slob dpon chos mchog la sogs pas 'dod pa'i bag chags kyi phyogs la yang pha rol pos brjod pas nyes pa bsal nas rang gi 'dod pa brjod pa ni de ma thag pa'i zhes bya ba'o //* See also PVin I 43,14–44,2 for Dharmakīrti's theory of the latent impression.

<sup>27</sup> TṬ 282,14 on ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 175d: *śloke svaśaktiśabdena vāsanām āha /*

<sup>28</sup> Kā 163,25 on ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 176b: *na ca sādhyavikalō dṛṣṭāntaḥ / dvayahīnavāsanābhyupagamāt / bauddhānāṃ hi svāmśaṃ na grhṇāti / na ca tena grhyate / NR 316,17 on ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 176b: *vāsanāvāt / sā hi svāmśaṃ na grhṇāti, nāpi svāmśena grhyate iti / TSP<sub>2</sub> 705,12 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2066cd: *katham asmīn anantare prayogadvaye* (emendation following TSP<sub>1</sub> : *prayogadvaye* TSP<sub>1</sub>, TSP<sub>Pa</sub> (also adopted in TSP<sub>2</sub>); cf. *gtan tshigs gnyis po... la T*) 'pi sādhyadharmānvito dṛṣṭāntaḥ siddha ity āha – dvayahīnā hi vāsaneti / dvayena grāhyagrāhakatvena /**

is a cognition (*samanantarapratyaya*).<sup>29</sup> Whatever arises from a cognition can neither be grasped nor grasper, so that a cognition can neither be grasped or grasper with respect to a part of itself (*svāmśa*).

### 1.2.2 The *jñānatva* argument

The *jñānatva* argument is as follows:<sup>30</sup>

The cognition of Caitra does not cognize the grasped part of the cognition occurring in [Caitra] himself<sup>31</sup> because it is a cognition [itself] (*jñānatvāt*), like [the cognition] occurring in another body [e.g., of Maitra].<sup>32</sup>

It is clear that the cognition of Maitra does not apprehend the cognition of Caitra, which also implies that the cognition of Maitra does not apprehend a part of the cognition of Caitra. In the same manner, the cognition of Caitra does not apprehend a part of the cognition of Caitra himself. This is attributed to the fact that the respective cognitions of Caitra and Maitra equally have the property of being cognitions.

In other words, this argument is based on what it means to be a cognition (*jñānatva*). This will also be of importance for understanding the development of Dharmakīrti's *saṃvedana* argument and will be taken up again below.

## 2. Śāntarakṣita's defense of self-awareness

Let us now examine how Śāntarakṣita rebuts all the arguments Kumāriḥla formulated in ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 172cd–177ab.

### 2.1 The *sahopalambhaniyama* argument

Śāntarakṣita commences his refutation of the first group of arguments as follows:

TS<sub>2</sub> 2068:

*apṛthag vedanāt pūrvam tasyaiva<sup>33</sup> pratipāditāt /*

*aikarūpyāparijñānaparyanteṣu na siddhatā //*

<sup>29</sup> Kā 163,20 on ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 175d: *jñānotpatter iti hetuḥ / tad dhi samanantarapratyayād utpadyata iti bauddhā manyante /*

<sup>30</sup> ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 176cd–177ab (quoted as TS<sub>2</sub> 2067): *caitrajñānaṃ tadudbhūtajñānāmśagrāhyabodhakam // jñānatvān na bhaved yadvat tasya dehāntarodbhavam /*

<sup>31</sup> Kā 164,9 on ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 176cd–177ab: *caitrajñānaṃ dharmi // taccaitrodhūto yo jñānāmśo grāhyas tasya bodhakaṃ na bhavātīti sādhyam /*

<sup>32</sup> TSP<sub>2</sub> 705,15 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2067: *yadvat tasya caitrajñānodbhūtajñānāmśasya maitrādidēhāntarodbhavaṃ jñānam //*

<sup>33</sup> *tasyaiva em. (de nyid T) : tad atra TS<sub>J</sub>, TS<sub>Pa</sub> (adopted in TS<sub>1</sub> and TS<sub>2</sub>).*

Since [the non-difference between an object and its cognition]<sup>34</sup> has already been explained as based on [the logical reason of] not being separately cognized, [all the reasons] up to the reason “not being perceived as identical” have [the fault of] being unestablished.

According to Kamalaśīla,<sup>35</sup> with the expression *apṛthag vedanāt* “because they are not cognized separately,” Śāntarakṣita refers to the reason *sahopalambhaniyamāt* “because they are necessarily perceived together,” of Dharmakīrti’s *sahopalambhaniyama* argument. Since this argument establishes the non-difference between an object and the cognition thereof, all the four reasons in Kumārila’s first group of arguments are to be considered unestablished (*asiddha*).

It is to be noted, in passing, that Śāntarakṣita reformulates the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument earlier in the TS as follows:<sup>36</sup>

TS<sub>2</sub> 2029–2030:

*yatsaṃvedanam eva syād yasya saṃvedanaṃ dhruvam /*  
*tasmād avyতিরিক্তাং তাত তাতো বা না বিভিধ্যতে //*  
*yathā nīladhiyaḥ svātmā dviṭīyo vā yathoḍupaḥ /*  
*nīladhīvedanaṃ cedaṃ nīlākārasya vedanam //*

If a cognition of X is necessarily a cognition of Y, X is not different from Y, or Y does not differ from X. Just as the cognition’s own essence [is not different from the cognition of blue, or the cognition of blue does not differ from the cognition’s own essence], or just as the second moon [is not different from the first one, or the first moon does not differ from the second one]. And this cognition of the form of blue (*nīlākāra*) is [necessarily] a cognition of the cognition of blue (*nīladhī*). [Therefore, the form of blue is not different from the cognition of blue, or the cognition of blue does not differ from the form of blue.]

As noted by Umbeka, Dharmakīrti’s *sahopalambhaniyama* argument basically has the reverse factors of the *aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna* argument. Namely, the property to be proved (*sādhyadharmā*) is “being non-different [from each other]” (*abheda*) rather than “being different [from each other]” (*bhinna*), and the logical reason is “being necessarily perceived together” (*sahopalambhaniyama*) rather than “not being perceived as identical” (*aikarūpyeṇajñāna*) or “being perceived separately” (*bhedopalambhana*). In Dharmakīrti’s treatment, this is the main argument corresponding to Kumārila’s first group, meaning that, if Dharmakīrti’s treatment is later than Kumārila’s, then the *aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna* argument is being taken to imply or speak for the other three arguments of the first group,

<sup>34</sup> TSP<sub>2</sub> 705,20 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2068: *abhedasya nīlataddhiyoḥ prasādhitatvāt...* / See n. 58.

<sup>35</sup> TSP<sub>2</sub> 705,18 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2068: *apṛthag vedanād iti nīlataddhiyoḥ saḥopalambhaniyamāt / apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadrṣṭiḥ prasīdhyati //* (= PVin I 54cd) *ity atah svasaṃvitprasāadhanena pratipāditād abhedasya nīlataddhiyoḥ prasādhitatvād aikarūpyāparijñānaparyantā hetavo na siddhāḥ //* (For *nīlataddhiyoḥ saḥopalambhaniyamāt* in the quotation TSP cf. PVin I 54ab.)

<sup>36</sup> See Matsuoka 2011 for the interpretation of TS<sub>2</sub> 2029–2030.

namely, the *tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti*, *tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa*, and *itaretaraparāmarśa-itaretarāparāmarśa* arguments.

## 2.2 Refutations of the *tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti* and *tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa* arguments

After collectively refuting Kumārila's first group of arguments, Śāntarakṣita discusses the *tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti* and *tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa* arguments individually.

### 2.2.1 Refutation of the *tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti* argument

To begin with, the logical reason of this argument is unestablished (*asiddha*). In order to show this, Śāntarakṣita cites PVin I 54cd with slight modification and further argues.<sup>37</sup>

TS<sub>2</sub> 2073:

*aprasiddhopalambhasya nārthavittiḥ prasidhyati* <sup>38</sup>

*tan na grāhyasya saṃvittir grāhakānubhavād ṛte* <sup>39</sup>

For someone whose perception is not established, the cognition of the object is not established. Therefore, there is no cognition of the grasped without an experience of the grasper.

The point is that an object can be established, in Dharmakīrti's words, as perceived only when the cognition of an object is perceived. It cannot be the case that the cognition is not perceived when its object is perceived.

In the *tatsaṃvitti-asaṃvitti* argument, Kumārila has increased the scope of the reason that a cognition is not cognized when its object is cognized on the basis of the statement in Śabara's *Bhāṣya* that only an object as connected with the external world (*bahirdeśasambaddha*) is perceived. In connection with this statement, Śāntarakṣita points out that what is perceived is not always an external object, and thereby argues that Kumārila's reason is inconclusive (*anaikāntika*).

TS<sub>2</sub> 2074:

*asvasthalocanair dr̥ṣṭaṃ tathā pītādy avekṣyate* *!*

*vispaṣṭaṃ*<sup>40</sup> *grāhakāṃśāc ca saṃvedyaṃ na tathā param* *!!*

[Unreal objects like] yellow, etc., that are seen by someone with an eye-disease are vividly (*vispaṣṭam*) perceived in that way [i.e., connected with the external

<sup>37</sup> See Kellner 2011 for a comparison of the two different arguments for self-awareness that are presented in PS(V) I 11d–12 and PVin I 54cd.

<sup>38</sup> This is a quotation of PVin I 54cd, with *aprasiddhopalambhasya nārthavittiḥ TS : apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadr̥ṣṭiḥ* PVin, which reads “For someone who does not perceive perception, the perception of the object is not established either” (trans. Kellner 2011: 420). For the further discussion with PVin I 54cd as Dharmakīrti's argument of infinite regress, see Kellner 2011.

<sup>39</sup> *grāhyasya...* *!!* TS; ŚV *Śūnyavāda* 79cd.

<sup>40</sup> *vispaṣṭaṃ* em. (*gsal por T, vispaṣṭam TSP<sub>J</sub>*) : *niṣkṛṣṭaṃ* TS<sub>J</sub>, TS<sub>Pa</sub> (adopted in TS<sub>1</sub> and TS<sub>2</sub>).

world],<sup>41</sup> and they are not perceived [separately (*niṣkṛṣṭam*)] from the grasping part.<sup>42</sup> Likewise for another [i.e. yellow as seen by someone with healthy eyes].<sup>43</sup>

Needless to say, in the case of an erroneous cognition, someone with an eye-disease perceives an object that is not externally existent.

### 2.2.2 Refutation of the *tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa* argument

In attacking the *tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa* argument, Śāntarakṣita begins by saying the following:

TS<sub>2</sub> 2075:

*alakṣitaviśeṣā ca grāhyarūpe<sup>44</sup> ca sā smṛtiḥ |*  
*sarvato bhinnarūpe tu na sābhyāsādyasambhavāt //*

A recollection by which a particular is not observed occurs with respect to an object to be grasped. But it does not occur with respect to an object distinguished from all others since habituation (*abhyāsa*) and the other [causal factors for ascertainment] are not possible.

According to Kamalaśīla,<sup>45</sup> an individual entity cannot be remembered because recollection (*smṛti*) is not capable of having an individual for its object, unlike perception. A perception of an individual entity can cause the perceiver to determine (*adhyavasāya*) that the object is an individual if one of several causal factors for ascertainment (*niścayahetu*) is present:

<sup>41</sup> TSP<sub>2</sub> 706,23 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2074: *vispaṣṭam ity atra chedaḥ | tatheti yathā satyābhimataṃ pītādi bahirdeśasambaddhaṃ vispaṣṭam upalabhyate tathā kāmālādyupahatanayanopalabdham api samīkṣyate | (vispaṣṭam ity TSP<sub>J</sub> (gsal por nges pa zhes bya ba T) : niṣkṛṣṭam ity TSP<sub>Pa</sub>; both editions TSP<sub>1</sub> and TSP<sub>2</sub> have niṣkṛṣṭam ity.)*

<sup>42</sup> TSP<sub>2</sub> 706,25 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2074: *grāhakāṃśāc ca samvedyaṃ neti chedaḥ | grāhakāṃśād iti niṣkṛṣṭam ity adhyāhāryam |*

<sup>43</sup> TSP<sub>2</sub> 707,7 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2074: *tathā param iti satyābhimatam api pītādi |*

<sup>44</sup> *grāhyarūpe* em. (gzung ba'i ngo bo la T) : *bāhyarūpe* TS<sub>J</sub>, TS<sub>Pa</sub> (adopted in TS<sub>1</sub> and TS<sub>2</sub>).

<sup>45</sup> TSP<sub>2</sub> 707,14 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2075cd: *etad uktaṃ bhavati – na tāvad vikalpasya yathāvasthitavastugrahaṇa-sāmarthyam | tasyāvastuviṣayatvāt | kevalaṃ tathābhūtapadārthānubhavabalād yatraivārthitvādayo niścayahetavaḥ santi tatra tadākārādhyavasāyī smārtāḥ pratyayo nirviṣaya eva | paramārthataḥ svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravṛtter bhrānta eva sarvo jāyate | tasya tv adhyavasāyavaśena viṣayavyavasthā na paramārthataḥ | na ca grāhyādhyavasāyaḥ smṛter api vidyate | kevalaṃ tathāvidhābhyāsapāṭavapratyāsattitāratamyādikāraṇābhāvād alakṣitaviśeṣā bhavati | yena smaraṇāntarād viśiṣyate | Variant readings: yatraivā- TSP<sub>J</sub>, adopted in TSP<sub>1</sub> and TSP<sub>2</sub> (gang kho na la T) : yathāivā-TSP<sub>Pa</sub>; paramārthataḥ n.e. T; -ābhyāsapāṭavapratyāsattitāratamyādi- em. Cf. *tasya kāraṇam abhyāsaḥ pratyāsattis tāratamyabuddhipāṭavaṃ cetyādi | TSP<sub>2</sub> 244,18 on TS<sub>2</sub> 587 : -ābhyāsapāṭavādar apratyāsattitāratamyādi- [sic] or -ābhyāsapāṭavader apratyāsattitāratamyādi- [sic] TSP<sub>J</sub>, TSP<sub>Pa</sub>. The editions TSP<sub>1</sub> and TSP<sub>2</sub> read -ābhyāsapāṭavāder apratyāsattitāratamyādi-, T reads *goms pa gsal ba gzan myur ba dang ches myur ba la sogs pa'i*. The emphasized part corresponds to PVI II 46,7: *svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravartanāt*. See also PVSV 31,16–32,12 on PV I 58 for Dharmakīrti's explanation of causal factors for ascertainment (*niścayapratyaya*). I referred to Kellner's (2004) descriptions of PVSV 32,5–12 for the translations of *niścayahetu*, *tathāvidhābhyāsa*, *pāṭava*, *pratyāsattitāratamyā*.**

a [state of] habituation due to similar situations (*tathāvidhābhyāsa*), acuity [of cognition] (*pāṭava*), or the [difference in] degree of proximity (*pratyāsattitāratamya*). There are no such causal factors for ascertainment in the case of recollection, which means that its objects will always be determined as universals instead of particulars.

Now, if recollection has only a universal character for its object, how could the object be remembered?<sup>46</sup>

Śāntarakṣita answers the question by saying the following:

TS<sub>2</sub> 2076:

*gṛhīta iti ko 'py evaṃ nānyathā smaraṇaṃ bhavet /  
śuddhasphaṭikasāṅkāśe vidyate<sup>47</sup> smaraṇaṃ na ca //*

Otherwise, there could be no recollection as in the form “Something was grasped.” And there is no recollection [of a grasper]<sup>48</sup> like a pure crystal.

There is no recollection of a cognition like a colorless transparent crystal that is not marked with the form of its object. Even if there is a case where, after cognizing a certain object, one cannot remember the object in a specific way, it does not follow that one is remembering a cognition which grasped no object.

Śāntarakṣita concludes that the logical reason presented in PS I 11c is established whereas that of the *tatparāmarśa-aparāmarśa* argument is not.

### 2.3 The *saṃvedana* argument

Śāntarakṣita then continues on to refute the arguments of group 2 as follows:

TS<sub>2</sub> 2077:

*kambupītādivijñānair hetvoḥ<sup>49</sup> paścimayor api /  
anaikāntikatā vyaktaṃ dig eṣānyatra sādhanē //*

In view of the cognition of a yellow conch-shell and the like, the latter two logical reasons are clearly inconclusive (*anaikāntika*). This is the way to deal with the other reasons [to prove the existence of an external object, too].<sup>50</sup>

Like in TS<sub>2</sub> 2074,<sup>51</sup> Śāntarakṣita here gives as an example of an erroneous cognition in order to point out that the logical reasons of the two *jñāna-utpatti* arguments and of the *jñānatva* argument are all inconclusive.

<sup>46</sup> TSP<sub>2</sub> 707,22 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2076: *syād etat – katham avasīyate grāhyādhyavasāyo 'trāsti smṛter ity āha – gṛhīta ityādi /*

<sup>47</sup> *vidyate* em. following *yod pa T* : *vedyate* TS<sub>J</sub>, TS<sub>Pa</sub> (adopted in TS<sub>1</sub>, TS<sub>2</sub>).

<sup>48</sup> TSP<sub>2</sub> 707,24 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2076: *na cāpi kevalo grāhyākārānaṅkitamūrtitayā grāhakaḥ śuddhasphaṭikasāṅkāśaḥ smaryate /*

<sup>49</sup> *hetvoḥ* em. with TS<sub>2</sub> (*gtan tshigs... gnyis po T*) : *hetoḥ* TS<sub>J</sub> (adopted in TS<sub>1</sub>), *heto* [sic] TS<sub>Pa</sub>.

<sup>50</sup> TSP<sub>2</sub> 708,10 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2077d: *eṣā dig ity anyatrāpi bahirarthasādhanē paropanyaste eṣā dūṣaṇadik /*

<sup>51</sup> See section 2.2.1.

To explain, suppose that there occurs a cognition of yellow with reference to a white conch-shell. The erroneous cognition cognizes the form (*ākāra*) of yellow, which is a part of the cognition and which has no counterpart in the external world.<sup>52</sup> If a continuum of cognitions is accepted, then the erroneous cognition must be presumed to arise from an immediately preceding cognition. Alternatively, the cognition, which is identical with the form of yellow, is cognized by the grasping part of the erroneous cognition.<sup>53</sup>

It is to be noted that, according to Kamalaśīla,<sup>54</sup> the other (*anyat*) cognition, that is, the non-erroneous cognition, also deviates from “not cognizing a part of [cognition] itself.” Even the cognition of a white conch-shell or that of someone with healthy eyes also cognizes a part of the cognition, which means that every cognition cognizes itself.

This reminds us of Dharmakīrti’s *saṃvedana* argument which was reformulated by Śāntarakṣita as follows:

TS<sub>2</sub> 2032:

*saṃvedanam idaṃ sarvaṃ na cārthāntaragocaram /*

*saṃvedanasvabhāvatvāt<sup>55</sup> svātmasaṃvedanam yathā //*

Every cognition does not have for its object anything other [than the cognition itself] because it has the essential nature of a cognition, like the cognition of one’s own self.

According to Dharmakīrti as well as Śāntarakṣita, no cognition cognizes any object distinct from the cognition itself because its essential nature is that of a cognition.

For both Dharmakīrti and Kumāriḷa, the essential nature of a cognition is being that which illuminates (*prakāśaka*).<sup>56</sup> What is illuminated, however, differs for each: the cognition itself or an external object, respectively. Therefore, the same logical reason “being a cognition itself” or “having a cognition as its essence” will yield opposite implications; for Kumāriḷa, a cognition never cognizes a part of the cognition (*svāṃśa*), whereas for Dharmakīrti, it never cognizes anything different from the cognition.

Thus, in the same way as was the case with the *aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna* and *sahopalambhaniyama* arguments (cf. section 2.1), here too, Dharmakīrti seems to have reversed only the properties to be proved of the *jñānatva* argument and then let this imply the other two *jñāna-utpatti* arguments of the second group.

<sup>52</sup> TSP<sub>2</sub> 708,6 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2077: *tathā hi – yathā yadi pītaśaṅkhādijñānaṃ jñānotpannam api sat svāṃśaṃ pītādyākāraṃ grhṇāti / (tathā hi yathā TSP<sub>1</sub>: yathā TSP<sub>2</sub>: ‘di ltar na T; n.e. TSP<sub>Pa</sub>, TSP<sub>1</sub>.)*

<sup>53</sup> TSP<sub>2</sub> 708,7 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2077: *yathā ca jñānam api sat jñānāṃśasya pītāder grāhyasya bodhakaṃ bhavati /*

<sup>54</sup> TSP<sub>2</sub> 708,7 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2077: *tathānyad apīti vyabhicāritā hetvoḥ /*

<sup>55</sup> For *saṃvedanasvabhāvatvāt* TS<sub>J</sub>, TS<sub>Pa</sub> (adopted in TS<sub>2</sub>, cf. also *rig pa’i rang bzhin nyid kyi phyir* TSP<sub>P</sub>, *rig pa’i rang bzhin nyid kyi rig* TSP<sub>D</sub>), TS<sub>1</sub> emends to *saṃvedanam ca nīlasya*.

<sup>56</sup> PV III 329: *prakāśamānas tādātmyāt svarūpasya prakāśakaḥ / yathā prakāśo abhimatas tathā dhīr ātmavedinī //*; TS<sub>2</sub> 2081a: *vijñānatvaṃ prakāśatvam ... / ŚV Śūnyavāda 187ab quoted in TS<sub>2</sub> 2017ab: prakāśakatvaṃ bāhye ‘rthe śaktyabhāvat tu nātmani /*

### 3. Against *nirākāravāda*

Lastly, let us consider how Śāntarakṣita regards the function of the *sahopalambhaniyama* and *saṃvedana* arguments.

After reformulating the *saṃvedana* argument, he states:

TS<sub>2</sub> 2034:

*śuddhasphaṭikasāṅkāśam arthākārair anāṅkitam /  
yair iṣṭaṃ vedanaṃ kaiścid idaṃ tān prati sādhanam //*

Both<sup>57</sup> of these [arguments] are addressed to those who maintain that a cognition is not marked with the form of its object, being like a pure crystal.

That is, according to Śāntarakṣita (as understood by Kamalaśīla, see n. 57) both the *sahopalambhaniyama* and *saṃvedana* arguments are meant to prove self-awareness (*svasaṃvid*), which, stated from a different perspective, is the same as proving that a cognition is marked with the form of its object (*sākāratā*).<sup>58</sup> Those who claim that a cognition is not marked with the form of its object (*nirākāratā*) are none other than *nirākāravādins* represented by Kumārila.

Thus, according to Śāntarakṣita, Dharmakīrti's aim in including both of these arguments is not to prove *svasaṃvid* or *sākāratā* yet again after it had already been proved (*siddhasādhana*) by the other of the two, as suggested by Śubhagupta;<sup>59</sup> indeed, it would not be appropriate, given the rules of debate, for Dharmakīrti to offer two arguments for the same thing only for the sake of improving upon the position laid out by Dignāga. Rather, as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla helpfully point out, these two arguments must be meant for refuting *nirākāravāda*; after all, in refuting an opposing position, it is indeed permitted to adopt as many approaches as might be necessary.

### 4. Concluding remarks

According to Śāntarakṣita, the reason Dharmakīrti developed his arguments is to defend Dignāga's theory of self-awareness against the attack by Kumārila. In order to counter Dignāga's arguments for *dvirūpatā* and *svasaṃvedyatā* respectively, Kumārila had argued that an object and its cognition are different from one another on the basis of the fact that they are perceived differently (*bhedopalambhana*), and, secondly, that a cognition never cognizes a part of itself on the basis of its essential nature of being a cognition (*jñānatva*).

<sup>57</sup> TSP<sub>2</sub> 696,14 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2034d: *idaṃ iti dvividham api sādhanam nirākāravādinam prati yatas tena na siddhasādhyatā /*

<sup>58</sup> The logical reasons *sahopalambhaniyama* and *saṃvedana* are collectively called *svasaṃvitprasādhana* or *sākāratāsiddhisādhana* by Kamalaśīla. TSP<sub>2</sub> 695,14 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2032: *dvitīyam api sākāratāsiddhaye sādhanam āha – saṃvedanam idaṃ ityādi /* TSP<sub>2</sub> 705,20 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2068: *ataḥ svasaṃvitprasāadhanena pratipāditād abhedasya nīlataddhiyoḥ prasādhitatvāt... /* See n. 34.

<sup>59</sup> In BASK 87 Śubhagupta points out that the *saṃvedana* argument is not valid because it proves what is already proved (*siddhasādhana*) by the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument. BASK 87 is quoted in TSP<sub>2</sub> 696,11 on TS<sub>2</sub> 2034: *sākārajñānapakṣe ca tannirbhāsasya vedyatā / tasyābhede ca saṃsādhye siddhasāadhanatā bhavet //*

Accordingly, Dharmakīrti formulated the *sahopalambhaniyama* and *saṃvedana* arguments as counter-arguments against these arguments by Kumārila.

Although it is unacceptable to the ŚV-commentators such as Umbeka, Śāntarakṣita's interpretation of the relation among the various arguments given in PS I, ŚV *Śūnyavāda* and PVin I is reasonable. This is because, although it is clear that Kumārila, in his exhaustive detail, was attempting to refute Dignāga's arguments from multiple perspectives, it should also be apparent from the dual nature of Dharmakīrti's argumentation that he himself was also responding to a challenge. To do so, Dharmakīrti simply reversed the factors of the *aikarūpyeṇa-ajñāna* and *jñānatva* arguments in particular, implying that – from his perspective – these two arguments would also cover the other five arguments which Kumārila employed. If Dharmakīrti thereby successfully boiled down these discussions to their essential issues, this could then represent a rather elegant response to Kumārila's detailed challenge.

## References and abbreviations

### Primary sources

- BASK** Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā: See Mikogami 1986.
- D** sDe dge edition of the Tibetan bstan 'gyur: *sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka bsTan 'gyur – preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo*, ed. J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi, and Y. Ejima. Tshad ma 1–20. Tokyo 1981–1984.
- Kā** Kāśikā: *The Mīmāṃsāsālokavārttika with the Commentary Kāśikā of Sucaritamiśra*, ed. K. Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī. Trivandrum 1926–1943.
- NR** Nyāyaratnākara: *Mīmāṃsāsālokavārttikam*. Varanasi: 1898.
- P** Peking edition of the Tibetan bstan 'gyur: *The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition*, ed. D. T. Suzuki. Tokyo/Kyoto 1955–1961.
- PS I** Pramāṇasamuccaya, chapter 1 (Pratyakṣa), ed. E. Steinkellner. [https://www.oeaw.ac.at/fileadmin/Institute/IKGA/PDF/forschung/buddhismuskunde/dignaga\\_PS\\_1.pdf](https://www.oeaw.ac.at/fileadmin/Institute/IKGA/PDF/forschung/buddhismuskunde/dignaga_PS_1.pdf), last visited 09-08-2019.
- PSV** Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti: See PS I.
- PV I** Pramāṇavārttika, ch. 1 (Svārthānumāna): See PVSV.
- PV III** Pramāṇavārttika, ch. 3 (Pratyakṣa): See PVV.
- PVA** Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra: *Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣyam or Vārttikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta: Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikam*, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1953.
- PVATS II** Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā Supariśuddhā, ch. 2 (Pratyakṣa): Tibetan translation, D 4226 me 1–328a7; P 5723 me 1–436a8 (Vol. 135, pp. 77–252).
- PVin I, II** Pramāṇaviniścaya, chapters 1 (Pratyakṣa)–2 (Svārthānumāna): *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya: Chapters 1 and 2*, ed. E. Steinkellner. Beijing/Vienna 2007.
- PVSV** Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti: *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the first chapter with the autocommentary, text and critical notes*, ed. R. Gnoli. Rome 1960.
- PVV** Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti: *Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇa-vārttikam ācārya-Manorathanandikṛtayā vṛtṭyā saṃvalitam*, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Appendix to *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* 24–26 (1938–1940).

- ŚBh** Śābarabhāṣya: See Frauwallner 1968.
- ŚV** Ślokavārttika: ŚV<sub>V</sub>=ŚV<sub>T</sub>=ŚV<sub>M</sub>.
- ŚV<sub>M</sub>** Ślokavārttika: See TṬ.
- ŚV<sub>T</sub>** Ślokavārttika: See Kā.
- ŚV<sub>V</sub>** Ślokavārttika: See NR.
- T** Tibetan translation of TS(P) (in cases where D and P have identical readings).
- TS(P)** Tattvasaṅgraha/-Pañjikā: TS(P)<sub>J</sub>=TS(P)<sub>Pa</sub>=TS(P)<sub>1</sub>=TS(P)<sub>2</sub>
- TS(P)<sub>1</sub>** Tattvasaṅgraha/-Pañjikā: *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla*, ed. E. Kṛṣṇamācārya. 2 vols. Baroda 1926.
- TS(P)<sub>2</sub>** Tattvasaṅgraha/-Pañjikā: *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary “Pañjikā” of Shrī Kamalashīla*, ed. D. Śāstri. 2 vols. Varanasi 1968.
- TS<sub>D</sub>** Tattvasaṅgraha, Tibetan translation, D 4266 ze 1–133a6.
- TS<sub>J</sub>** Jaisalmer Ms of the *Tattvasaṅgraha*, no. 377. In *A Catalogue of Manuscripts in Jaisalmer Jain Bhandaras*, comp. Muni Jambūvijayajī. Delhi/Jaisalmer 2000, 40.
- TS<sub>P</sub>** Tattvasaṅgraha, Tibetan translation, P 5764 'e 1–159a5.
- TS<sub>Pa</sub>** Pāṭāṇa Ms of the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, no. 6679. In *Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Pāṭāṇa Jain Bhaṇḍāra*, comp. Muni Jambūvijayajī. 3 vols. Ahmedabad 1991, vol. 1, p. 199.
- TSP<sub>D</sub>** Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā, Tibetan translation, D 4267 ze 133b1–'e 331a7.
- TSP<sub>J</sub>** Jaisalmer Ms of the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, no. 378. In *A Catalogue of Manuscripts in Jaisalmer Jain Bhandaras*, comp. Muni Jambūvijayajī. Delhi/Jaisalmer 2000, 40.
- TSP<sub>P</sub>** Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā, Tibetan translation, P 5765 'e 159b2–ye 495a7 (Vols. 138–139, pp. 200–164).
- TSP<sub>Pa</sub>** Pāṭāṇa Ms of the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, no. 6680. In *Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Pāṭāṇa Jain Bhaṇḍāra*, comp. Muni Jambūvijayajī. 3 vols. Ahmedabad 1991, vol. 1, p. 199.
- TṬ** Tātparyaṭīkā: *Ślokavārttikavyākhyā Tātparyaṭīkā of Uṃveka Bhaṭṭa*, ed. S. K. Rāmanātha Śāstrī. Madras 1971.

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### Concordance of passages cited

TS(P) <sub>2</sub>	TS(P) <sub>1</sub>	TS(P) <sub>J</sub>	TS(P) <sub>Pa</sub>	TS(P) <sub>P</sub>	TS(P) <sub>D</sub>	Citation of
k. 2029	k. 2030	103a3	37b10	89a6	74a4	
k. 2030	k. 2031	103a4	37b10	89a7	74a4	
k. 2032	k. 2033	103b2	37b12	89b2	74a6	
695,14	570,4	P 211a7	P 232b16	P 162a3	P 123a1	
k. 2034	k. 2035	103b2	37b12	89b2	74a7	
696,11	570,23	P 211b2	P 233a5	P 162a3	P 123a7	BASK 87
696,14	570,26	P 211b3	P 233a7	P 162b5	P 123b1	
k. 2063	k. 2064	105a4	38a12	90b5	75a7	ŚV <i>Śūnyavāda</i> 172cd–173ab
k. 2064	k. 2065	105a4	38a13	90b5	75a7	ŚV <i>Śūnyavāda</i> 173cd–174ab
k. 2065	k. 2066	105a5	38a13	90b6	75b1	ŚV <i>Śūnyavāda</i> 174cd–175ab
704,22	577,23	P 213a6	P 234b12	P 166b8	P 127a3	
k. 2066	k. 2067	105a6	38a14	90b7	75b1	ŚV <i>Śūnyavāda</i> 175cd–176ab
705,11	577,26	P 213a7	P 234b14	P 167a2	P 127a4	
705,12	577,26	P 213a7	P 234b14	P 167a3	P 127a5	
k. 2067	k. 2068	105a6	38a14	90b7	75b2	ŚV <i>Śūnyavāda</i> 176cd–177ab
705,15	578,3	P 213a8	P 234b16	P 167a4	P 127a6	
k. 2068	k. 2069	105b1	38a15	90b7	75b2	
705,18	578,8	P 213a8	P 234b16	P 167a5	P 127a7	
705,20	578,9	P 213a8	P 234b17	P 167a6	P 127a7	
k. 2069	k. 2070	105b2	38a15	91a1	75b3	ŚV <i>Śūnyavāda</i> 79
k. 2070	k. 2071	105b2	38a16	91a1	75b3	ŚV <i>Śūnyavāda</i> 83
k. 2071	k. 2072	105b3	38a17	91a2	75b4	ŚV <i>Śūnyavāda</i> 84
k. 2072	k. 2073	105b3	38a17	91a3	75b4	ŚV <i>Śūnyavāda</i> 85cd (=TS <sub>2</sub> 2072ab)
k. 2073	k. 2074	105b4	38b1	91a3	75b5	

<b>TS(P)<sub>2</sub></b>	<b>TS(P)<sub>1</sub></b>	<b>TS(P)<sub>J</sub></b>	<b>TS(P)<sub>Pa</sub></b>	<b>TS(P)<sub>P</sub></b>	<b>TS(P)<sub>D</sub></b>	<b>Citation of</b>
<i>k.</i> 2074	<i>k.</i> 2075	105b5	38b1	91a4	75b5	
706,23	579,9	P 213b3	P 235a7	P 167b7	P 127b7	
706,25	579,11	P 213b4	P 235a8	P 167b8	P 128a1	
707,7	579,14	P 213b5	P 235a10	P 168a2	P 128a2	
<i>k.</i> 2075	<i>k.</i> 2076	105b5	38b2	91a5	75b6	
707,14	579,23	P 213b7	P 235a13	P 168a6	P 128a5	
<i>k.</i> 2076	<i>k.</i> 2077	105b6	38b3	91a5	75b6	
707,22	580,2	P 213b7	P 235a16	P 168b2	P 128a7	
707,24	580,7	P 213b8	P 235b1	P 168b3	P 128b1	
<i>k.</i> 2077	<i>k.</i> 2078	105b6	38b3	91a6	75b7	
708,6	580,10	P 214a1	P 235b2	P 168b5	P 128b2	
708,7	580,12	P 214a1	P 235b3	P 168b6	P 128b3	
708,10	580,15	P 214a2	P 235b4	P 168b8	P 128b5	